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Summary
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), between the United
States, Mexico, and Canada was the first trade agreement ever linked to worker ights
provisions in a major way.  Its companion "side agreement," the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC, which rhymes with "talc") went into
effect with NAFTA on January 1, 1994.  The NAALC agreement is "broad" in that
NAFTA signatories agree to enforce their own labor laws and standards while
promoting 11 worker ights principles over the long run.  However, under NAALC,
sanctions as an enforcement tool are applicable to only three of the 11 labor principles
(pertaining to minimum wages, child labor, and occupational safety and health), and
are not applicable to three basic rights:  the right to organize, bargain collectively, and
strike.
NAALC and NAFTA were negotiated by the Administration and approved by
Congress under presidential "fast-track" authority — without amendment and with
limited debate.  This authority which expired in 1994 was included in the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act (OCTA) of 1988.  It encouraged the birth of a
document such as NAALC when it listed as a principal negotiating objective in trade
agreements " o promote respect for worker ights."  The 104th Congress considered
but failed to pass renewed fast-track authority.  In the 105th Congress, H.R. 2621 and
S. 1269, both reported out of committee, would have renewed presidential f st-track
authority but limited the potential to include worker rights provisions in trade
agreements negotiated under fast-track procedures.  They would have permitted only
worker ights provisions aimed at preventing foreign governments from lowering or
"derogating from" their existing domestic labor standards (e.g., child labor standards),
in order to attract investment or inhibit international trade.
The U.S.-Jordan free trade agreement (P.L. 107-43, September 28, 2001)
incorporated provisions from both the NAALC and the House and Senate-reported
fast-track bills from the 105th Congress.  In addition, for the first time, it included
labor provisions in the body of the agreement and made them subject to the same
dispute resolution procedures as other provisions in the trade agreement.  Letters
exchanged by the U.S. and Jordanian governments, however, vowed to resolve
differences under the agreement without resorting to sanctions.  H.R. 3005, the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, was introduced October 3, 2001
(Thomas et al), and reported by the House Ways and Means Committee on October
9, to extend presidential fast-track or trade promotion authority to July 1, 2005.
Provisions of H.R. 3005 both compare and contrast to those in OCTA.
Trade liberalization ultimately results in gains to all economies; however, there
are winners and losers (both industries and workers) along the way.  Worker rights
provisions could mitigate the effects of trade liberalization on both winners and losers
by increasing labor costs in developing countries.  However, NAALC as a worker
rights promotion vehicle with a developing country has mitigated the effects of trade
expansion from NAFTA very little so far, because most compliance is voluntary.
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imposed labor standards on trading partners, but it had never before entered into a mutual
trade agreement which had a major labor component attached.
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NAFTA Labor Side Agreement:  Lessons for
the Worker Rights and Fast-Track Debate
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) — between the United
States, Mexico and Canada, went into effect January 1, 1994.  With it was the first
labor side agreement ever attached to a trade agreement.  This marked the first time
that worker ights considerations were ever linked to a trade agreement i  more than
just a passing manner.  The 43-page document was called the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).1
NAALC and NAFTA were negotiated under fast-track authority which Congress
had given to the President under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
(P.L. 100-418).  This authority also contained streamlined procedures for
congressional consideration f a negotiated trade agreement, prohibited amendments,
and limited debate.  The negotiation of NAALC was supported by specific language
in the 1988 Trade Act:  Section 1101 identified as a principal negotiating objective
in trade agreements "to promote respect for worker rights."
Presidential fast-track authority to negotiate rade agreements expired in 1994.
The 105th Congress reported two bills to extend this authority, which also would
have limited somewhat the authority of the President to include worker rights (and
environmental) provisions in future trade agreements.  This CRS Report includes an
analysis of worker rights provisions in the Administration's fast-track proposals
reported on October 8 and October 23, 1997.2
The Worker Rights and Fast-Track Controversy
The worker-rights and fast-track controversy reflects the concernsof two sets
of constituents.  One set could include some corporations (especially multinational
corporations).  They could argue that fast-track reauthorization which mandates the
promotion of respect for worker ights provisions through trade agreements might
CRS-2
3 A country has a comparative advantage, r lative to a trading partner, in those goods which
it produces relatively more efficiently than its partner does.  Thus, these are the goods it is
likely to export.
hamper their ability to tap the natural comparative advantage3 of low-wage, labor-
abundant countries in producing labor-intensive goods, and thereby compete
successfully in the international marketplace.  Into this group could also fall
consumers looking for lower-priced goods and services.  Both groups could want
fast-track provisions which somehow limit the negotiation of labor provisions
connected with trade agreements.   
On the other side are some representatives of organized labor, who argue that
by promoting worker ights the United States erves "humanitarian" objectives.  They
also argue that worker ights provisions linked to trade agreements could offer U.S.
workers at least some shelter against competition based on lower wages and lack of
worker rights in developing countries.  These propon nts end to want fast-track to
include broad authority to negotiate strong labor provisions in trade agreements.
Some economists tend to see the worker rights and trade arguments described
above as a debate over protectionism vs. free trade. That is, imposing worker rights
destroys the basis for trade in these countries and generally dampens income growth
and economic development.  They point out that as nations develop economically and
production rises, they tend to adopt worker ights protections a  workers shift their
focus and their demands from merely wages and holding a job to broader concerns
over the quality of their work environment.  
Others counter that worker ights adoption i  developing countries i  hampered
because workers around the globe are conve ging into a common labor pool.  As a
result, workers in any one developing country may not approach full employment and
thereby have some bargaining power against multinational corporations until some
time in the distant future.  This is because production operations can be easily
relocated to a country with lower wages and lower standards.  Therefore, worker
rights advocates argue, developing countries need to have labor standards provided
for them; trade agreements are good vehicles for promoting these standards.  
The worker ights debate so far has been based largely on theoretical rguments.
Because NAALC is the first labor side agreement, it is both an experiment and a
prototype.  It provides an early opportunity to see the benefits and drawbacks of
linking worker ights provisions to trade agreements, and to evaluate the specific way
in which they are linked.
The purpose of this report, therefore, is to examine seven  years of experience
under NAALC for insights into the worker ights-and-trade agreement issue which
could be applicable to the current debate on worker rights provisions in trade
agreements.  This report is divided into three parts.  The first part sets out to briefly
describe the worker protection structure that NAALC has created.  The second part
evaluates NAALC's characteristics and results as input into the debate on whether and
how to authorize a continued link between worker ights and trade.  The third part
puts NAALC findings into the fast-track and current worker-rights debate and
CRS-3
4 NAALC is not included in the 3,755-page two-volume set of congressional documents which
contain NAFTA and its implementing legislation.  (U.S. Congress.  House of Representatives.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Texts of Agreement, Implementing Bill, Statement
of Administrative Action, and Required Supporting Statements.  House Document 103-159,
November 4, 1993.)  The NAALC was submitted to Congress in a separate House document
(H.Doc. 103-60, November 9, 1993.)  A copy of it can be found, however, in Bureau of
National Affairs, Daily Labor Report, September 15, 1993, p. D-1—D-12.  The Agreement
can also be found on the Internet:
[http://www.naalc.org/english/infocentre/NAALC.htm].
5 The five basic worker rights included in U.S. trade laws are defined as internationally
recognized worker ights by Sec. 502(a)(4) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.  These are:
(1) the right of association; (2) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (3) prohibition
of forced or compulsory labor; (4) a minimum age for employment of children; and (5)
acceptable conditions of worker rights with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health.  Incorporation of the rights in trade laws is outlined in U.S.
Library of Congress.  Congressional Research Service.  Worker Rights Provisions and Trade
Policy: Should They Be Linked? by Mary Jane Bolle. CRS Report 96-661E, p. 10-11.  The
six core ILO labor standards are: (1) and (2) the right to organize and bargain collectively
(with the implied right to strike – ILO standard nos. 87 and 98); (3) prohibition of forced
labor (nos. 29 and 105); (4) minimum age for employment (no. 138); (5) equal pay for men
and women (no. 100); and (6) freedom from employment discrimination (no. 111).  Source:
U.S. Library of Congress.  Congressional Research Service.  Trade Agreements and the
International Labor Standards of the ILO, by Lois McHugh.  June 30, 1994.  CRS Report 94-
535F, p. 4.
examines practical questions the two main groups of constituents are asking:  Who
are the winners and losers from trade liberalization both in general and with Mexico?
How do worker ights requirements in general change that equation?  What have been
the effects of NAALC as a vehicle for worker rights provisions?  Does NAALC
improve the efficiency and welfare gains to the U.S. economy, or does it diminish
them?  What have been NAALC's benefits to workers so far?
The Structure that NAALC Created
As a first effort o link worker ights and trade agreements, NAALC is essentially
a non-invasive way of promoting worker ights.4  It is non-invasive in that it does not
require any country to adopt any new worker rights laws or conform to any
international standards — only to enforce what it already has on the books.  NAALC
is at the same time, both "broad" and relatively "weak."  The breadth of NAALC is
in the number of labor principles it includes, that each country agrees to promote.
NAALC includes more than just the five worker ights principles incorporated into
U.S. trade laws, or the six worker ights principles identified as core labor standards
by the International Labour Organization (ILO).  It includes all of the above plus two
other rights (workers' compensation and migrant worker protection).  These
principles are listed in figure 1.5 
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Figure 1.  NAALC'S Labor Principles
GROUP AND PRINCIPLES
EXTENT OF
ENFORCEABILITY
GROUP I
     1.  Freedom of association and
          protection of the right to organize;
     2.  The right to bargain collectively; and
     3.  The right to strike.
Enforceable by discussion of
National Administrative Offices,
Secretariat, and Ministerial
Council  
GROUP II  
     1.  Prohibition of forced labor;
 
     2.  Minimum employment standards
          pertaining to overtime pay;
     3.  Elimination of employment
          discrimination;
     4.  Equal pay for women and men;
     5.  Compensation in cases of
          occupational injuries and illnesses; and
     6.  Protection of migrant workers.
Enforceable by discussion as
indicated for Group I plus
evaluation by an Evaluation
Committee of Experts.
GROUP III
     1.  Labor protections for children and
          young persons;
 
     2.  Minimum employment standards
          pertaining to minimum wages; and
     3.  Prevention of occupational injuries
          and illnesses.
Enforceable by discussion as for
Group I, evaluation as for Group
II, and sanctions determined by
an Arbitral Panel.
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Figure 2.  Administrative Structure Set Up by NAALC
  
 
The "weakness" of NAALC is in the enforceability of those labor principles.  All
NAFTA partners agree to promote all 11 principles in the long run, as mentioned, and
to comply with their own labor laws and standards which relate to these principles in
the short run.  However, only three of the 11 principles are enforceable by sanctions
if a country does not self-enforce.  
The enforceable principles are li ted in group III  in figure 1.  (Those in group I
are subject only to discussions among NAALC partners and those in group II may be
addressed, in addition, by recommendations from an outside committee of experts.)
The road to sanctions against a country that does not enforce its own labor laws is a
long one.  It can take more than two years when all procedures specified by NAALC
(including waiting periods) are followed.
All procedures for handling a labor dispute (a complaint that another country is
not enforcing its own labor laws or standards) start out the same, regardless of
whether or no that complaint involves a principle for which sanctions  are  permitted.
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Figure 3.  Dispute Resolution Bodies Under NAALC
  (To see how the ECE and AP fit into NAALC structure, see figure 2.) 
    Evaluation Committee of
            Experts (ECE)
                 (may consider  
         Group II or III Principles)
  
          Arbitral Panel (AP) 
    (may ultimately impose sanctions 
       for Group III Principles only)
An ECE:  
! consists of 3-members 
! is appointed at the request of any Party 
Functions — The ECE:
! investigates patterns of practice in
enforcing standards related to group II
or III principles
! that are trade-related and covered by
mutually-recognized labor laws
An AP:  
! consists of 5-members
! is appointed by a 2/3 vote of the labor
ministers
Functions — The AP: 
! investigates a persistent pattern of failure
to effectively enforce standards related to
group III 
! that are trade related and
! covered by mutually-recognized labor
laws
 
Powers and Procedures:  
     The ECE shall:
! analyze any pattern of        practice in
enforcement of its standards; and
! offer an assessment, conclusions, and     
   recommendations.
     
     Each party shall: 
! provide written responses.      
Powers and Procedures:  
     The AP shall:
! determine whether there has been a
persistent pattern of failure to effectively
enforce its standards;
! offer recommendations; and
! offer or approve an action plan;
     and may:
! impose a monetary enforcement      
assessment; and
! suspend NAFTA benefits to thea mount of the
monetary assessment.
An ECE may evaluate and make
recommendations when any country fails
to enforce its own group II or III worker
rights law.
An AP may investigate and ultimately
impose sanctions when any country fails to
enforce its own group III worker rights
law.  Maximum sanctions from any one
submission are equal to suspension of
NAFTA tariff reduction benefits for one
year.
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6 For additional discussion of the administrative structure set up by NAALC, see Pérez-López,
Jorge.  The Institutional Framework of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.
U.S. Mexico Law Journal, Symposium 1995, p. 133-147.  
7 Both the United States and Mexico will accept submissions from citizens or organizations
within the United States as well as outside the country.  However, the submissions must
concern a matter arising in a country other than the country where the submission is being
made.
8 An ECE may not be convened if a Party to the agreement obtains a ruling from an
independent expert selected by the Ministerial Council that he matter is not trade- related or
is not covered by mutually-recognized labor laws.
9 The AP does not issue the sanctions itself.  Rather, it makes findings as to implementation
or the lack of it, which brings into play the complaining Party's right under NAALC to
suspend benefits against the other Party (article 41 of NAALC).
The  procedure is  that an observer may bring  a  complaint, called a "submission" to
the National  Administrative  Office  (NAO) in  his  or  her  own country.6  [See
figure 2 showing the organizational structure stablished by NAALC — called the
Commission on Labor Cooperation (Commission).]  Each country has an NAO
headed by a Secretary and located in its labor department.  Each NAO has its own
rules on who may file submissions.7  NAOs may consult with each other and hold
hearings.  If the issue cannot be resolved by "cooperative consultation" at the NAO
level, it may be addressed by labor ministers involved in the dispute, and if there is still
not resolution, by a meeting of labor minsters from NAFTA countries, who together
form the Ministerial Council (MC).  The Ministerial Council (i.e., the U.S. Secretary
of Labor in Washington and counterparts in Ottawa and Mexico City) is supported
by a 15-member staff called the Secretariat (which is located in Dallas).
If the issue is not resolved at the ministerial level and it relates to a group II or
group III  principle, the MC may refer it to an Evaluation Committee of Experts
(ECE).  The three-member ECE lies outside the Commission, and is created at the
request of any NAFTA partner, on a case-by-case basis by the MC, from a roster of
experts.  The ECE may investigate patterns of alleged non-enforcement and make
recommendations, after which the ministers consult again.8  
If the matter is still not resolved and it relates to a group III  principle (child labor
minimum wage, or occupational safety and health), it may be referred to an Arbitral
Panel (AP) which may investigate further.  The five-member AP is also created by the
MC from a roster on a case-by-case basis.  The AP may, as an ultimate penalty against
a country for failure to enforce its own standards, i sue a monetary assessment.  If this
is not paid, sanctions may result.9  Maximum penalties would be suspension of
NAFTA benefits to the amount of the monetary penalty (which may be no greater
than NAFTA benefits from tariff reductions) for one year.  Functions of the ECE and
AP, and the scope of their powers, are summarized in figure 3.
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10 Resources for this section include the following: Compa, Lance.  Another Look at NAFTA.
Dissent, Winter 1997, p. 45-50.  The Failed Experiment: NAFTA at Three Years.  Jointly
published by the Economic Policy Institute, the Institute for Policy Studies, the International
Labor Rights Fund, Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, the Sierra Club, and the U.S.
Business and Industrial Council Educational Foundation, June 26, 1997, 34 p.;  Testimony
of Lori M. Wallach, Public Citizens' Congress Watch, September 9, 1993 before the House
Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Employment, Housing and Aviation
on the NAFTA Labor and Environmental "Side" Agreements, 15 p.; Levinson, Jerome.
NAFTA's Labor Side Agreement: Lessons from the First Three Years, Published jointly by
the Institute for Policy Studies and the International Labor Rights Fund.  November 21, 1996,
28 p.; Milanovic, Nikola.  An Examination of the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation, for the International Labor Rights Fund.  Discussion Draft, 42 p.; and Harvey,
Pharis.  Myth #4: NAFTA's Labor Agreement Has Teeth, in NAFTA's First Two Years: The
Myths and the Realities, Sarah Anderson and John Cavanaugh, Institute for Policy Studies,
and David Ranney, university of Illinois at Chicago, editors, March 26, 1996, p. 18-20.
11 Compa, Lance. op. cit. p. 45-50.
12 Wallach, Lori, op. cit., p. 3.
Major Characteristics and Results of NAALC10
NAALC's major characteristics relate to its groundbreaking existence, its nature
as a promoter of worker ights, yet preserver of sovereignty, and its enforcement
mechanism.  All three characteristics are seen as controversial.
NAALC's Groundbreaking Existence
The very existence of a labor side agreement is groundbreaking i  the history of
trade agreements.  At the same time, this existence can be viewed from four
perspectives:  It is an accomplishment to some; it falls short of the original plan to
others; it is a signal of alarm to a third group; and is considered unnecessary by a
fourth group.  
As an accomplishment, NAALC promotes international engagement in labor
rights and standards on an unprecedented scale.11  It is a first acknowledgement that
workers making oods for export are intimately connected with the products that are
traded, and, some would say, pawns in the process.  
Yet to others, NAALC falls short of the original plan.  They argue that NAALC
does not go nearly far enough in protecting workers:  If workers were granted status
equal to that of the goods they produce, the worker rights provisions would be in
NAFTA and enforceable under it.  The possibility would exist for the termination of
NAFTA benefits or expulsion from NAFTA.12  Instead, NAALC is "only" attached
to NAFTA in a side agreement.  Maximum disciplinary action is suspension of a
portion of NAFTA benefits for one year.  
Still others view NAALC with alarm.  They argue that it is like a "foot in the
door."   It impinges on the freedom of multinational corporationst  bring goods to
the consumer at the lowest possible cost, and it deprives developing countries of the
source of their comparative advantage.
CRS-9
13 Levinson, Jerome.  op. cit., p. 3.  
14 The Failed Experiment.  NAFTA at Three Years., op. cit., p. 19.
15 Milanovic, Nikola.  An Examination of the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation, op. cit., p. 38.
The last group argues that NAALC is unnecessary.  They point out that the ILO,
a large organization with more than 1,800 employees, has been working for more than
75 years to promote and monitor worker rights adoption around the world on a
voluntary basis, and needs no assistance in this matter.
NAALC: Promoter of Worker Rights and Preserver of
Sovereignty
Beyond the controversial fact that NAALC exists at all, it can be viewed as a
vehicle that at the same time both promotes worker ights and preserves sovereignty.
Herein lies another area of controversy.
NAALC promotes worker ights by  creating a system of utual obligation and
mutual responsibility.  All countries agree to promote and comply with their own
laws relating to the 11 labor principles.  Mutual accountability is enhanced by the fact
that there are three parties to NAALC and therefore, there will likely be a majority
opinion even if the most powerful tools available are "cooperative consultation"
among the NAFTA partners and moral suasion. 
Yet, when mutual accountability breaks down, as it is apt to do from time to
time, NAALC's critics find fault with NAALC's enforcement mechanism.  The fact
that not all labor principles under NAALC are equally enforceable has been identified
as NAALC's "fatal flaw"13 in that the three most basic of all labor rights — to
organize, bargain collectively, and strike — are the least enforceable of the 11 labor
standards.  They are subject only to two different levels of "cooperative consultation"
among the three NAFTA Partners—consultation among the NAOs and consultation
among the labor ministers.14  All labor principles, some argue, should be subject to
consultations, evaluations, and arbitrations.15
NAALC preserves sovereignty in several ways.  First, it does not  require
"harmonization" — that the same body of standards apply in all three NAFTA
countries.  Under NAALC each country maintains its freedom to adopt its own labor
laws and standards and enforce them as it sees fit.  If a country does not support a
labor principle by already having, or by adopting and then enforcing a national labor
law or standard upholding that principle, no compliant may be brought against i  for
failure to offer such protections to its workers.   
Second, NAALC preserves overeignty by its enforcement mechanism.
"Cooperative consultation" is the primary way of settling disputes.  No country can
be compelled to enforce its own labor laws and standards.  When enforcement
mechanisms of NAALC are taken to the limit, sanctions are restricted by their
atachment to only a few standards and monetary penalties are restricted to a
percentage of goods traded for the most recent year.  While repeated submissions can
CRS-10
16 The Failed Experiment.  op. cit., p. 20, and Milanovic, op. cit., p 39 and 42.
17 Milanovic, op. cit., p. 39.  The maximum monetary penalty is a percentage (0.007%) of
total goods traded between the Parties during the most recent year for which data re available
(Annex 39.1 in NAALC).  If there is an initial failure to pay a penalty, then the complaining
Party (country) can suspend benefits in an amount no greater than needed to collect the
assessment (NAALC Article 41.1).  If a Party is not fully implementing an action plan, the
complaining Party may annually suspend benefits in an amount sufficient to collect any
previously imposed monetary penalty. (Article 41.2).  If a country uses as its measure, a
suspension f NAFTA tariff benefits, it can not raise the duty beyond either the Most Favored
Nation (MFN) rate or the pre-NAFTA rate (whichever is lower).  In any event, the country
cannot collect more money than the assessment (Annex 41B).
be brought against any country that exhibits patterns of non-enforcement, there is no
international court system. 
Some observers find fault with NAALC's preservation of sovereignty.  In
particular, they see as a major weakness the lack of harmonization.  They argue that,
as an alternative to harmonization f standards, entities that do businesses in two or
more NAFTA countries should be held responsible for meeting certain standards in
all operations.  Such standards, they argue, could be embodied in a corporate code
of conduct, modeled on the codes already recognized by the United States, Canada,
and Mexico in two documents:  the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the ILO
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy.  Promoters of this position argue that adherence to the code could be
reinforced by an annual labor information audit which includes pecific inspection of
such things as terms and conditions of employment, and wages.16
NAALC's Enforcement Mechanism
Beyond the controversy over promoting worker ights vs. preserving individual
sovereignty, a third level of conflict exists over the details of the enforcement
mechanism in NAALC.  Penalties are one area of enforcement controversy; hearings
procedures are another.  
Penalties under NAALC are characterized as "low" by some, and as "high" by
others who argue that NAALC should not include penalties.  Those who want to raise
penalties have offered suggestions about how to do so.  One suggestion is to include
a penalty for anyone offering to waive a NAALC principle to induce or retain an
investment.  Another suggestion is to establish an arbitral disputes panel to prevent
the importation i to any NAALC nation of goods produced with exploitative child
labor, slave or forced labor, or by unhealthy processes.  A third suggestion is to raise
the penalty limits for any country not complying with its own labor laws.17
The hearings process is characterized by required steps and time limits.  While
some see these steps as a way to encourage compliance with NAALC, others see
them as a burden, particularly on businesses that must prepare responses ven when
no possibility for sanctions is i volved.  (This pertains to submissions relating to the
right to associate, organize, and bargain collectively.)  
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18 Milanovic, op. cit., p. 38-42.
19  A local labor board denied registration to workers of Maxi-Switch (which produces
keyboards for computers and computer games) and after the company allegedly fired some
400 workers for union activity.  Hearings were scheduled.  Then, to the surprise of many, two
days before hearings were to begin, the local Mexican labor tribunal awarded the workers
union registration when they reapplied.  As a result, the submission was withdrawn, and
victory was declared by Mexico's independent labor. Bureau of National Affairs.  Daily Labor
Report.  NAFTA Complaint Adds to Recognition of Mexican Union, according to Experts.
April 23, 1997, p. A-2; and Mexican Labor Group Calls for Action Following Victory in
Maxi-Switch Campaign, April 28, 1997, p. A-4—A-5.  Supporting NAALC's worker rights
accomplishments, however, has been the changing political climate in Mexico.
Still others argue that he time allowed for each step (particularly when an ECE
or AP is involved) is too long, thus slowing down the dispute resolution process and
limiting the number of submissions cases that can be processed by the small staff of
the various bodies established under NAALC's administrative structure.  A final group
suggests requiring that hearings be held at a convenient site for affected workers (i.e.,
within the same country as and a reasonable distance from the relevant plant).18  
NAALC's Results
Between January 1, 1994 when NAALC first went into effect and September
6, 2000, 23 submissions were filed.  These include 14 allegations against Mexico, two
against Canada, and 7 against the United States.  Most of the allegations against
Mexico were for failure to uphold Mexican laws giving workers the right o organize
and bargain collectively.  Others concerned the illegal use of child labor, pregnancy-
based gender discrimination, minimum employment standards, and occupational safety
and health. The ones against the United States typically involve Mexican workers
(such as migrant workers) and issues such as freedom of association, protection of
migrant workers, various worker standards, and safety and health.
Two accomplishments i  particular stand out above the others.  Some might say
"surprisingly."  
First, in one case, NAALC has encouraged Mexico to begin enforcing its own
labor law permitting workers the right o organize and bargain collectively.  This came
about primarily through "sunshine," prescribed under the NAALC dispute resolution
process and against the predictions of many observers.19  
A second major result from NAALC so far has been the creation of a labor
communications superhighway connecting the three NAFTA partners.  Before
NAFTA went into effect, information comparing laws and labor market indicators
among the three countries was not always readily available.  However, in its first three
years NAALC has fostered studies comparing the labor laws of the three countries,
nurtured the development of a standardized system of labor market indicators, and
been responsible for studies comparing productivity levels and wage rates.  (Some of
this work had been undertaken i  the past, to a lesser extent, by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.) 
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20 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.  Study on the Operation and Effects of the North
American Free Trade Agreement.  July 1997, p. vi.
An Administration report evaluating NAFTA after three years (as required by
NAFTA) identified other related accomplishments under NAALC:  The NAALC
submission process resulted in permission for secret union ballots at two companies
where union votes previously were not secret. In addition, between 1993 and 1996,
Mexico's Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare increased funding for enforcement
of labor laws by almost 250 percent.  Moreover, Mexico reported a 30% reduction
in the number of workplace injuries and illnesses in the first three years after  NAFTA
was signed, suggesting greater enforcement of its worker ights tandards relating to
occupational safety and health.20
Putting NAALC Findings into the Fast-Track Debate
Experience under NAALC is important in the fast track debate because it offers
lessons from actual events.  Two key insights to be gained from three years under
NAALC that are applicable to the current debate are these:
First, experience under NAALC has shown that open-ended fast-track language
endorsing worker rights as a principal negotiating objective does not necessarily
result in a "strong" labor side agreement that incorporates many sanctions.  The shape
of the worker ights provisions depends little on the language in the original fast-track
provision.  Provisions in a labor side agreement depend on what the specific parties
to the trade agreement involved.  Thus, the argument could be made that the shape
of worker ights provisions in a trade agreement appears to depend much more on
what trading partners are willing to agree on, and very little on the scope of the
original fast-track authority. 
For example, when the United States and Canada negotiated NAALC with
Mexico, the fact that sanctions on key worker rights provisions — the right to
organize, bargain collectively, and strike — were omitted, resulted from the unique
identity of the NAFTA partners, and from the resistance of Mexico, in particular, as
a developing country.  In general, developing countries have been resistant to the idea
of linking worker rights provisions and trade agreements.  This position was made
clear at the World Trade Organization December 1996 Singapore Ministerial, when
trade ministers from the more than 110 member countries met o discuss trade issues.
At that meeting, developing countries blocked the formation of a group to even study
the issue of linking worker rights to trade.  
Second, a side agreement based primarily on cooperation rather than sanctions,
can have some ffect on promoting adherence to worker ights.  This became evident
when Mexico finally recognized a single union after repeated submissions alleged
Mexico's failure to grant workers the right to organize (referred to above).
Other questions also remain about the effects of including worker rights
provisions in trade agreements negotiated under fast-track language:  Who are the
winners and losers generally from trade liberalization?  How do worker rights
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21 In the developing country, winners tend to be labor-intensive producers who can use high-
technology manufacturing processes from the developed country to produce more efficiently.
Losers tend to be those producers and their employees who formerly produced goods and
services which can be more efficiently produced and imported by the developing country
partner.  Some small Mexican grain farmers, for example, have lost under NAFTA to
Mexican imports of efficiently produced American corn.
provisions in trade agreements change this equation?  Who are the winners and losers
under NAALC?  
It should be emphasized that the terms "winners" and "losers" group various
entities into artificial categories.  In reality "winners" and "losers" fall along a
continuum which includes all combinations between two extremes.  The discussion
below concentrates on salient winners and losers without trying to calculate exactly
where they might fall along the spectrum, and without identifying those in the large
middle section.  
Who Are the Winners and Losers from Trade Liberalization?
In general, winners from liberalized trade include the overall economies of all
countries to the trade agreement.  This is because trade liberalization improves
economic efficiency.  Each country exports those goods and services it produces most
efficiently and imports those which it produces least efficiently.  The result is lower
costs for consumers, but sectoral production shifts along the way may leave in their
wake a mix of "winners" and "losers."  
Trade agreements between developed and developing countries, tend to result
in three groups of winners for the developed country (see figure 4, part I):21  The first
group typically consists of is higher-skill, higher-tech businesses that produce a given
good or service relatively more efficiently and therefore more cheaply than their
developing country trading partners can produce it.  These are the exporters.  The
second group is labor-intensive businesses that relocate  to  the  developing  country
to save on production costs.  Theoretically such businesses could produce in the
developing country for both domestic onsumption a d for export.  The third group
is domestic businesses which use imports from the developing country as components
in their production processes.  Losers in the developed country from trade
liberalization with a developing country, on the other hand, are often labor-intensive
low-wage import-competing businesses (and their workers).  These groups would
loose market share from cheaper imports.
CRS-14
Figure 4.  Winners and Losers in a Developed Country Under 
Three Conditions of Trade with a Developing Country
Winners Losers
I.   Potential Effects of
Trade Liberalization
(Example:  NAFTA)
Higher-skill, higher-tech
businesses could benefit
from reduced trade
barriers.  
Labor-intensive lower-
wage import-competing
businesses could lose from
reduced protections
(tariffs) on competing
imports.
Labor intensive
businesses that relocate
to the country of the
trading partner could
benefit by reducing
production costs.
Workers in import
competing businesses
could lose if their
businesses close or
relocate.
Domestic businesses
which use imports as
components into the
production process may
save on production costs.
II.  Potential Effects of
Trade Liberalization
Modified by Worker 
Rights Adherence
Adherence to worker
rights requirements could
raise foreign labor costs
slightly, making U.S.
imports more competitive. 
Consequently, workers in
import-competing
businesses could be under
less pressure to either
give back wages or have
their worker rights
protections threatened.
On the other hand, some
multinational corporations
wanting to relocate to the
developing country to save
on labor costs could be
discouraged from doing so
because worker rights
adherence could increase
their production costs. 
III.  Real-Life Example: 
Effects of Trade
Liberalization (i.e.,
NAFTA) Modified by
Worker Rights Adherence
Under NAALC
NAALC's worker rights effects so far have been
sufficiently mild that the end result is more like winners
and losers from trade liberalization (I above) than trade
liberalization modified by worker rights adherence (II
above). 
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22 The two recent studies tried to look at the extent to which adherence to worker rights
affected not winners and losers pecifically, but four components of trade in general: economic
efficiency; comparative advantage; foreign direct investment; and labor costs and/or wages.
One study was undertaken by the OECD, an organization that represents mo tly developed
countries.  It looked only at the impact on trade of two worker rights provisions for which data
for 75 countries were sufficient: freedom of association and the right o collective bargaining.
The other study was undertaken by the Overseas Development Council (ODC), an
organization that focuses on developing countries.  It included a broad range of measures of
worker rights adherence in 133 countries.
While the studies generally found little evidence that adherence to worker ights provisions
significantly affects any of the above four trade-related measures, one study did find one
effect: The ODC found (based on about 35 countries for which labor cost data were available)
fairly strong results linking the relationship between worker ights provisions and labor costs.
It found that labor costs tend to increase as labor standards become more stringent.  As a
correlative, the ODC study also found that per-capita income was higher where labor
standards become more stringent (without designating either per-capita income or labor
standards as the cause, and the other as the effect).
23 It is possible that Congress could permit the President to include worker rights provisions
in trade agreements but make them applicable only to matters that are "trade-related."  While
this term has no precise definition, it could include such employment situations as workers
producing for trade, workers whose productscompete with imports, and workers producing
domestically in businesses established and/or supported by foreign investment.
24 These arguments were taken from Trade Agreements Authority Act of 1995.  Report to
accompany H.R. 2371; H.Rept. 104-285.  Oct. 20, 1995, p. 12.
How Does the Equation Change When Worker Rights
Protections Are Added?
How do worker ights provisions in a trade agreement (again with a developing country)
change the winner-loser quation?   At least one study has found that worker rights adherence
may raise labor costs.22  Two recent studies looked at the extent to which adherence to worker
rights provisions affected winners and losers.  Worker rights provisions which result in worker
rights adherence by the developing country could dampen the gains of the winners and lessen
the losses of the losers in the developed country trading partner (i.e., the United States).
Details of how this works are spelled out in figure 4, part II. 
How Does the Scope of Presidential Fast-Track Negotiating
Authority Affect the Picture?
How does the scope of Presidential fast-track negotiating authority change the picture?
Renewed fast-track authority could grant the President either broad (open ended) authority
to include worker ights provisions or narrow authority to include worker rights provisions
in matters that are trade-related.23  Or, renewed authority could prohibit worker rights
provisions in trade agreements altogether, or some variant of the above. 
One argument for restricted Presidential authority is that fast-track procedures are not
intended to be used to implement general policy goals that are not directly related to trade.
Another argument for restricted authority is that worker ights policies could interfere with
benefits of liberalized trade.  As a disguised form of protectionism, they could decrease U.S.
market opportunities for its exports or distort or impede U.S. exports or imports.24  
CRS-16
25 Ibid., p. 28-29.
26 Workers producing for the maquiladora export sector have traditionally earned wages which
were substantially higher than those for workers producing for domestic consumption.
27 Levinson, Jerome, op. cit., p. 4.
28 H.Rept. 101-285, op. cit., p. 12.
The argument for broad authority is that it is a "tried and true formula," had bipartisan
support, and allowed the content of trade agreements to be determined on a case-by-case basis
reflecting the circumstances at the time.25  
Most likely winners and losers in the United States could be the same under both broad
and narrow scenarios, because U.S. businesses are affected primarily by what goes on in the
trade sector of the partner country.26  If worker rights provisions are excluded from trade
agreements altogether, winners and losers would remain the same as under liberalized trade
generally.
How Has NAALC Affected the Mix of Winners and Losers from
NAFTA?
NAALC's worker ights effects o far have been mild since they have had very little
effect on promoting Mexican enforcement of its own worker ights laws.  Therefore, the end
result from NAALC is a list of winners and losers that looks more like those from trade
liberalization (figure 4, part I above) than from trade liberalization modified by worker ights
adherence (figure 4, part II).  
NAALC appears to have offered very little protection for U.S. workers in import-
competing businesses, from employers who either elocate or close down.  Over the long run,
however, NAALC may improve the lives of Mexican workers and may be able to help low-
skilled U.S. workers who produce goods that compete with imports from Mexico.  Many
people argue that hese are worthy goals and that if NAALC contributes to them, the benefits
outweigh the costs.
To put the NAFTA-and-fast-track debate into a larger perspective, the basic argument
for including worker ights provisions in trade agreements is that his linkage offers workers
at least some level of protection from large multinational corporations.  Some argue that the
level of protection offered under NAALC is not enough:  "Worker rights are only one aspect
of the overall problem in redefining the international trade and investment regime to restore
some of the balance between the power of workers and management;" yet, they have "been
asked to carry a disproportionate part of the burden of that re-definition."27  
Others counter that protection offered under NAALC goes too far.  Some of these argue
that worker ights provisions really do not belong in a trade agreement at all.  They argue that
worker rights provisions hould not be included in trade agreements because they are
ultimately used for protectionist (not trade-liberalizing) purposes.  Others argue that while the
Congress has the power to negotiate agreements on worker ights, Congress should implement
such an agreement under normal, not fast-track consideration.  Thus, the House Ways and
Means Committee report on the fast-track reauthorization bill from the 104th Congress
included language which read: "Fast-track procedures are not intended to be used to
implement other, more general policy goals."28 
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Fast-Track Proposals
The issue of whether or not to pass new fast-track legislation has arisen anew in the
107th Congress.  While relatively quiet during the 106th Congress, it was a major issue during
the 105th.
1997 House and Senate-Reported Fast-Track Reauthorization
Bills
On October 8, 1997, the Senate Finance Committee and on October 23, 1997, the House
Ways and Means Committee r ported similar bills to extend presidential fast-track negotiating
authority:  S. 1269 (Roth, S.Rept. 105-102) and H.R. 2621 (Archer, H.Rept. 105-341, Part
I).
Under previous fast-track language in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, presidential authority to include worker ights provisions in trade agreements egotiated
on a fast-track basis was open-ended, and not subject to any limitations:  In part, the 1988 act
identified as a principal negotiating objective for any trade agreements negotiated on a fast-
track basis simply, "to promote respect for worker rights."  
In contrast o this broad authority, both House and Senate bills sharply limited
Presidential uthority to include worker ights provisions in trade agreements egotiated under
fast-track procedures.  They did this by setting up three sets of negotiating objectives.
However, while two of these sets — "principal negotiating objectives" and "international
economic policy objectives" — included references to worker rights, only the narrowly-
prescribed "principal" negotiating objectives were to be included in trade agreements
implemented under fast-track procedures.  
Principal negotiating objectives in both House and Senate bills permitted in agreements
slated for fast-track consideration, therefore, only those worker rights provisions aimed at
preventing foreign governments from: lowering or "derogating from" their existing domestic
labor standards (e.g., child labor standards) in order to attract investment or gain an advantage
in international trade.  (Details of the language differences between the House and Senate bills
are spelled out in figure 5.)  
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Figure 5.  Comparison of 1997 House and Senate Language 
Permitting Worker Rights Provisions in Trade Agreements 
Negotiated on a Fast-Track Basis
SENATE
S. 1269 (Roth)
S. Report 105-102, Oct. 8, 1997
HOUSE
H.R. 2621 (Archer)
H. Report 105-341, Part I, Oct. 23, 1997
PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES:
         (may be included in agreements 
     considered under fast-track procedures)
REGULATORY COMPETITION:
Sec. 2(b)(15)(B):  
A primary negotiating objective is to prevent the use of
foreign government regulation and other government
practices including the lowering of or derogation from
existing labor (including child labor),. . . standards for the
purpose of attracting investment or inhibiting United
States exports.
PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES:
         (may be included in agreements 
     considered under fast-track procedures)
LABOR . . . AND OTHER MATTERS:
Sec. 102(b)(7):
A principle negotiating objective is to address the
following aspects of foreign government policies and
practices regarding labor. . . that are directly related to
trade:
A)  to ensure that foreign labor practices do not arbitrarily
or unjustifiably discriminate or serve as disguised barriers
to trade; and
B)  to ensure that foreign governments do not derogate
from or waive existing domestic labor measures,
including measures that deter exploitative child labor, as
an encouragement to gain competitive advantage in
international trade or investment.   NOTHING in this
subparagraph is intended to address changes to a
country's laws that are consistent with sound
macroeconomic development.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
OBJECTIVES: 
         (may not be included in agreements 
     considered under fast-track procedures)
Sec. 2(c)(1)(C):
An international economic policy objective is to promote
respect for worker rights by:
(i) reviewing the relationship between worker rights and
trade; and
(ii) seeking to establish in the ILO a mechanism for the
systematic examination of and reporting on the extent to
which ILO members promote and enforce the following
worker rights:
! freedom of association; 
! the right to organize and bargain 
                   collectively;
! prohibition on the use of forced labor;
prohibition of exploitative child labor; and
! prohibition of discrimination in
              employment.
Sec. 2(c)(2)
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize
the use of trade agreement approval procedures to modify
U.S. law.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
OBJECTIVES:
         (may not be included in agreements 
     considered under fast-track procedures)
Sec. 102(c)(1)(C):
A U.S. priority is to promote respect for worker rights
and the rights of children and an understanding of the
relationship between trade and worker rights, particularly
by working with the International Labor Organization to
encourage the observance and enforcement of core labor
standards, including the prohibition on exploitative child
labor.
Sec. 102(c)(2):
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize
the use of the trade authorities procedures to modify U.S.
law. 
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29 In addition, the legislation generally tightens what may be contained in implementing bills
compared to prior law.  See H.R. 2621, Sec. 103(b)(3)(b) and S. 1269, Sec. 3(b)(3)(A). 
30 Gephardt Letter on Fast Track (to Ways and Means Committee Democrats).  Reprinted in
Inside U.S. Trade, October 10, 1997, p. 18-19.
31  The agreement can be found at: 
[http://www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeast/US-JordanFTA.shtml].
The House bill contained additional restrictions beyond those in the Senate bill.
Among other things, it limited worker rights provisions in trade agreements
negotiated on a fast-track basis, to cases where foreign government labor practices
are "directly related to trade."  Secondly it excluded from trade agreement bargaining,
changes to worker ights laws in another country which "are consistent with sound
macroeconomic development."
The third group of negotiating objectives, "international economic policy
objectives," included an additional reference to worker ights but was excluded from
fast-track procedures.  Both bills identified as an international economic policy
objective, to promote "respect for worker rights" through the International Labor
Organization (ILO).  The effect was to restrict fast-track procedures to implementing
labor provisions identified in principal negotiating objectives.29  Oth r labor
agreements requiring congressional implementation would have had to be considered
under normal legislative procedures, as would all labor agreements if fast-track were
not extended.
Limitations on fast-track procedure are a major issue for congressional debate.
Some argue that the limitations streamline trade agreements by focusing them on
traditional trade issues.  Such limitations, they maintain, are necessary to prevent the
use of labor standards as barriers to trade.  Moreover, they permit economies to
develop naturally on the basis of their own comparative advantage; rather than
potentially stunting their growth by imposing worker ights requirements on them as
they are struggling to grow.
Many of those who oppose the limitation, like Representative Gephardt, argue
that  provisions in both the House and Senate bills would have "validate[d] the status
quo" rather than being a "force for progress."  Progress would have been met if
"people and the environment were given the same protections and enforcement in
trade treaties as copyrights."  Including and enforcing worker rights protections
would have helped to create more of a consuming class; more people would have
been able to buy more U.S. products.  Companies would not have continued to chase
low wages, exporting jobs overseas simply to reduce production costs.  This might
have helped to halt the widening income gap between winners and losers that is being
observed in many countries.30
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement31
The U.S.- Jordan free trade agreement, signed on October 24, 2000,
incorporated provisions from both the NAALC and the House and Senat -reported
fast-track bills from the 105th Congress.  In addition, for the first time, it incorporated
labor provisions in the body of the agreement and made them subject o the same
CRS-20
32   Although the bill refers to core labor standards of the ILO, the definition of “core labor
standards” included in section 9(2) is actually the definition of “internationally recognized
worker ights” included in section 502(a)(4) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.  Both
sources included similar first four rights with slight nuances of difference;  (a) the right of
association ; (b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (c) prohibition of forced or
compulsory labor; (d) minimum age for the employment of children.  The ILO core labor
standards, instead of focusing on prohibition of forced labor and child labor focuses on
“elimination” of them.   In addition, the 1974 Trade Act and ILO core labor standards have
different fifth standards: While the Trade Act definition adopted in H.R. 3005 includes
acceptable conditions of work with respect o minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health, the ILO identifies as its fifth core labor standards, the
elimination of employment and occupational discrimination.
dispute resolution procedures as other provisions in the trade agreement.  Letters
exchanged by the U.S. and Jordanian governments, however, vowed to resolve
differences under the agreement without resorting to sanctions.
Similar to the NAALC agreement, the U.S.-Jordan agreement provides that
[article 6 (4)(a)] “a party shall not fail to effectively enforce its [own] labor laws.” It
adds to this phrase “in a manner reflecting trade,” which reflects language in the
House-reported bill that limits addressing foreign government labor policies to those
that “are directly related to trade.”
Similar to House- and Senate-reported fast-track language, the U.S.-Jordan free
trade agreement also [(Article 6(2)] provides that “each Party shall strive to ensure
that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise
derogate from [domestic labor laws] as an encouragement for trade with the other
Party.”
H.R. 3005:  Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001
H.R. 3005 (Thomas et al) the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act
(BTPAA) of 2001 was introduced on October 3, 2001, and passed on October 9, to
extend fast-track or trade promotion authority, as it has come to be called in the 107th
Congress, to July 1, 2005. 
The language is more specific and more detailed on the issue of worker ights
than was the language in the 1988 OTCA.  The OTCA included three worker rights
provisions in the principal trade negotiating objectives with respect o dispute
settlement: (a) to promote respect for worker ights; (b) to secure a review of the
relationship of worker ights to GATT articles; and (c) to adopt as a principle of the
GATT that the denial of worker rights should not be a means for a country or its
industries to gain competitive advantage in international trade.
The BTPAA, by comparison, (Sec. 2(a)) incorporates similar language in
identifying  overall trade negotiating objectives  (which may not be considered under
dispute settlement procedures): “to promote respect for worker ights and the rights
of children consistent with core labor standards of the ILO (as defined in section 9(2))
and an understanding of the relationship between trade and worker rights.”32  
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The BTPAA also identifies a number of other labor-related objectives as
principal negotiating objectives in trade agreements (Sec. 2(b)(10)):
! (A): to ensure that a party “does not fail to effectively enforce its. .  labor laws
through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction in a manner
affecting trade;”
! (B): to recognize that parties to the agreement “retain the right to exercise
discretion” in investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters,
and “to make decisions regarding the allocation of” enforcement resources
relating to “other labor. . .  matters determined to have higher priorities, and
to recognize that a country is effectively enforcing its laws if a course of action
or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of uch discretion or results from a
bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources;”
! (C):  to strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote respect for
“core labor standards (as defined in section 9(2));” and
! (G):  to ensure that labor. . . policies and practices of parties to trade
agreements with the United States “do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably
discriminate against United States exports or serve as disguised barriers to
trade.”
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to dispute
settlement and enforcement of trade agreements (Sec. 2(b)(11)) include seeking such
enforcement mechanisms as:
! (C): “early identification and settlement of disputes through consultation;”
! (D): “trade expanding compensation;” and
! (E): “a penalty” that “encourages compliance,” “is appropriate,” and “has the
aim of not adversely affecting parties or interests not party to the dispute while
maintaining the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism.”
In addition to negotiating objectives, the bill also provides that he President shall
(Sec. 2(c)):
! (1):  seek greater cooperation between the WTO and the ILO;
! (2):  seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties. . to promote
respect for core labor standards, and report o the House Committee on Ways
and Means and the Senate Finance Committee on the content and operation of
such mechanisms;
! (5):  review the impact of future trade agreements on U.S. employment, and
report o the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees on such
review;
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! (7):  have the Secretary of Labor consult with any country seeking a trade
agreement with the United States concerning that country’s labor laws and
provide technical assistance to that country if needed;
! (8):  submit to Congress a report describing the extent to which the country or
countries that are parties to the agreement have in effect laws governing
exploitative child labor; 
! (11):  report to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee on the effectiveness of the penalty or remedy in enforcing U.S.
rights under the trade agreement, and on whether the penalty or remedy was
effective in changing the behavior of the targeted party, and whether the
penalty or remedy had any adverse impact on parties or interests not party to
the dispute.
